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1. Introduction
This paper focuses on a particular aspect of the cautio fructuaria, the guarantee given 
by the usufructuary to the bare owner. This is part of my ongoing doctoral dissertation, 
thus my conclusions are far from being deﬁ nitive. Nevertheless, I thought it would have 
been interesting to expose my ﬁ rst impressions during the conference “Possessio ac iura 
in re. History of real law”.
The objective of my paper is to understand the meaning of the expression uti frui 
arbitrio boni viri, which can be found in one of the clauses of the cautio fructuaria.
This cautio, or more correctly this satisdatio1, was reconstructed in the following 
way by Otto Lenel: Cuius rei usus fructus testamento Lucii Titii tibi legatus est, ea re 
boni viri arbitratu usurum fruiturum te et, cum usus fructus ad te pertinere desinet, id 
quod inde extabit restiturum iri dolumque malum abesse afuturumque esse spondesne? 
Spondeo2.
2. Structure of the cautio fructuaria
The cautio fructuaria was composed by three clauses. The ﬁ rst one, de utendo clause, 
compelled the usufrucuary to use the thing burdened arbitrio boni viri, i.e. as a good 
man. The usufructuary was compelled by the second clause, de restituendo, to return 
the thing. Lastly, there was the de dolo clause, which imposed on the undertaker to not 
engage in fraudulent behaviour.
1 It is a satisdatio because the promise was assisted by sponsores, that is guarantors. See M. Talamanca, 
Istituzioni di diritto romano, Milano 1990, p. 349.
2 O. Lenel, Essai de reconstitution de l’Édit Perpétuel II, Paris 1903, p. 284.




As the restitution and the fraudulent behaviour clauses are not relevant to our study, 
we will focus our attention on the clause uti frui arbitrio boni viri. It is important to note 
that this guarantee took the form of a stipulatio praetoria, which was a promise imposed 
to one of the party by the praetor3. In fact it should be underlined that the usufructuary 
did not have any positive enforceable obligation, ensuing from the ius civile, toward the 
bare owner. This means that on the basis of the ius civile it was only possible for the bare 
owner to protect the thing burdened against damages provoked by a positive action4.
An example of a positive action is the death of a slave ﬂ ogged to death. In this case, 
the protection could be enforced by recurring to the lex Aquilia, which sanctioned the 
damages done to someone’s else property5. It was also possible to sue the usufructuary 
for theft, employing the condictio furtiva, nevertheless this was still a matter of positive 
behaviour. In fact, the situation was vastly different if the usufructuary was just negligent 
and inactive.
We can take as an example an usufructuary who did not farm correctly the land 
object of the usufruct. In this instance and in similar cases6, the bare owner had no 
civil recourse. For example, he could not act on the basis of the actio negatoria, which 
permitted the bare owner to deny the existence of the usufruct7. In fact, the usufruct did 
exist. The owner contested the way the thing was used, not the right of the usufructuary. 
Moreover it was not possible to apply the actio legis Aquiliae because there was no dam-
age caused corpore corpori, i.e., by direct contact of a body8. The bare owner thus could 
ﬁ nd himself in a difﬁ cult position because he was deprived of legal recourse. But, as it 
was usual during the Republic, the praetor stepped in and instituted a new remedy, the 
cautio fructuaria, which took the form of a stipulatio praetoria. The usufructuary was 
compelled by the praetor to use the thing arbitrio boni viri.
Thanks to the cautio the owner had an enforceable right, an actio ex stipulatu, be-
cause he could prosecute the usufructuary ex stipulatu, i.e. on the ground of the promise.
3 On the stipulationes praetoriae, see A. Palermo, Il procedimento cauzionale nel diritto romano, Milano 
1942; A. Mozzillo, Contibuti allo studio delle “stipulationes praetoriae”, (Pubblicazioni della facoltà giu-
ridica dell’Università di Napoli, 34), Napoli 1960; idem, s.v. “Stipulatio praetoria” [in:] Novissimo Digesto 
Italiano, vol. XVIII, diretto da A. Azara e E. Eula, Torino 1971, p. 450–456.
4 See G. Grosso, Usufrutto e ﬁ gure afﬁ ni nel diritto romano, Torino 1968, p. 270 sq.
5 About the lex Aquilia, see A. Watson, The Law of Obligations in the Later Roman Republic, Oxford 
1965, p. 234.
6 The examples of the usufructuary’s negligence are recorded in Ulpianus 18 ad Sabinum D. 7, 1, 13, 2: 
nam qui agrum non proscindit, qui vites non subserit, item aquarum ductus corrumpi patitur, lege Aquilia 
non tenetur, i.e. someone who did not plow the land, who did not plant vines and who let waterworks get 
damaged.
7 About the actio negativa, see G. Grosso, Usufrutto e ﬁ gure…, p. 402 sq.
8 F. Betancourt, Sobre una preten dida “actio” arbitraria contra el usufructuario, AHDE 1973, vol. 43, 
p. 359. As the author points out, it was not even possible to apply an actio legis Aquiliae in factum, because 
a culpa in faciendo would still have been necessary, whereas the cases recorded by D. 7, 1, 13, 2 are examples 
of culpa in omittendo.
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3. Common interpretation of the clause de utendo
The expression uti frui arbitrio boni viri, i.e. to use and enjoy as a good man, raises an 
important question: does it refer to an arbitrator or to an abstract standard of behaviour? 
In the ﬁ rst case, the bonus vir was a real man appointed by the praetor to decide if the 
usufructuary respected his obligations. In the second case, the bonus vir was an abstract 
criterion employed to understand the respect of the obligations undertaken by the usu-
fructuary with the stipulatio.
As far as I can see, the Romanist doctrine has privileged the idea of an abstract 
standard of behaviour. It is evident that most scholars considered that the reference to 
the bonus vir meant that the usufructuary should have behaved as an honest man. It is 
to be noted that the doctrine is generally quite vague about what exactly is entailed by 
this standard. Often, the scholars did not translate the term vir bonus, as if it were a self-
evident concept, whereas it is a rather complex notion9.
4. C.A. Cannata’s interpretation
However, there is a notable exception to this trend: Carlo Augusto Cannata10. According 
to this author, uti frui arbitrio boni viri refers to an arbitrator.
C.A. Cannata’s opinion makes it necessary to analyse the expression arbitrium boni 
viri and his interpretation of the sources.
Ulpianus 79 ad edictum D. 7, 9, 1, 6 stated that habet autem stipulatio ista duas causas, unam si 
aliter qui utatur quam vir bonus arbitrabitur, aliam de usufructo restituendo.
C.A. Cannata translates this text in the following way: “codesta stipulatio contiene 
due distinti oggetti: l’uno riguarda il fatto che si usi altrimenti da come il bonus vir indi-
cherà nel suo arbitrato, l’altra riguarda la restituzione dell’usufrutto”11. Thus, according 
to him, usurum se arbitrium boni viri means that the usufructuary would have had to use 
the thing burdened in the way the vir bonus, an arbiter, had indicated in his arbitration. 
The vir bonus would have been appointed by the praetor as an expert in order to evaluate 
the usufructuary’s behaviour.
9 A clear example of this approach is offered by G. Pugliese, Usufrutto, uso e abitazione, Torino 1972, 
p. 471. He just limited to commenting that boni viri arbitratu meant that the good object of the usufruct 
should not been deteriorated.
10 C.A. Cannata, Corso di istituzioni di diritto romano I, Torino 2001, p. 484–486. It should be noted 
that also Gianni Santucci expressed the idea that the bonus vir was an arbitrator. However, this theory was 
put forward during the conference Vir bonus. Un modello ermeneutico della riﬂ essione giuridica antica 
(Trani 28–29 October 2011) and the acts have not been published yet. For this reason, we will not analyse 
his reconstruction.
11 Ibidem, p. 484.
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5. Defence of the common interpretation
However, this theory meets, in my opinion, several objections. First, I would like to men-
tion that in our sources there is no mention of how this boni viri arbitratus took place 
or any indication given to the arbiter. On the contrary, there are such indications in the 
cases where we know for sure that the bonus vir was indeed a third party. I am alluding 
to the determination of the shares in a societas (partnership) made by a third party (D. 17, 
76–80). This is quite a complex matter and it has been the object of serious controver-
sies12. We are not going into details, but we will simply observe that the arbitration of the 
third party is problematic and that the jurisconsults have to determine what exactly was 
entailed by the viri boni arbitratus. Moreover, the possibility of an appeal was debated. 
We ﬁ nd nothing of this sort about the cautio fructuaria.
This is not the only reason that makes me think that we cannot identify the vir bonus 
with an arbiter appointed by the praetor. It is true that the majority of the passages of 
the Digest about the uti frui arbitrio boni viri are quite ambiguous and could also refer 
to a real person. Indeed, nothing is clearly stated. Nevertheless, in my opinion a passage 
might show that uti frui arbitrio boni viri entails an abstract standard of behaviour. I am 
alluding to Ulpian 18 ad edictum D. 7, 1, 15, 4: et si vestimentorum usus fructus legatus 
sit non sic, ut quantitatis usus fructus legetur, dicendum est ita uti eum debere, ne abu-
tatur: nec tamen locaturum, quia vir bonus ita non uteretur. This passage states quite 
clearly that a usufructuary should neither misuse neither rent the clothes, that are the ob-
ject of the usufruct, because a vir bonus would not have done so. The sentence vir bonus 
ita non uteretur seems alluding to an abstract standard of behaviour. In my opinion, the 
use of the imperfect subjunctive shows us that we are not dealing with a real situation, 
but with an hypothetical one: what would have done an abstract bonus vir in the same 
situation? How would have he behaved? It seems unlikely to me that this passage could 
be alluding to a concrete arbitrator assessing the behaviour of an usufructuary.
There is also another important objection to C.A. Cannata’s theory that should be 
taken into consideration: we should not forget that the cautio fructuaria is not the only 
stipulatio praetoria which mentions the expression arbitrio boni viri. On the contrary, 
several praetorian stipulations include a reference to the bonus vir. For example, in the 
cautio de conferendis bonis et dotibus13 the promisor, the emancipated child or the mar-
ried woman, committed himself to bring his own goods into hotchpot boni viri arbitratu. 
Also in this stipulation there are no evidence that the boni viri arbitratus referred to the 
arbitration of a third party14. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the other stipulationes 
praetoriae mentioning a reference to the viri boni arbitratus15: nothing gives us the im-
pression that the vir bonus was an arbitrator.
12 For the bibliography see F. Gallo, La dottrina di Proculo e quella di Paolo in materia di arbitraggio 
[in:] Studi Grosso III, Torino 1969, p. 479–542 and G. P. Solinas, A proposito dell’ “arbitrium boni viri” [in:]
Studi in onore di Gaetano Scherillo II, Milano 1972, p. 539–571.
13 About this subject see A. Guarino, Collatio bonorum, Roma 1937.
14 About this see ibidem, p. 137 sq.
15 The other stipulationes praetoriae are: cautio pro praede litis et vindiciarum; cautio iudicatum solvi; 
cautio ex operis novi nunciatione; cautio de evicta hereditate legata reddi.
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For the reasons above stated, I do not think that C.A. Cannata’s opinion is backed up 
by our sources. In my opinion, it is possible that the reference to the arbitratus boni viri 
in the cautio fructuaria was a way to enlarge the powers of the iudex. In fact, the actio 
ex stipulatu, which issued from any praetorian stipulation, was an actio stricti iuris, i.e. 
it left the judge little discretion. The reference to the bonus vir, a concept strongly linked 
to the ﬁ des bona16, gave more ﬂ exibility to the actio ex stipulatu.
6. Bonus vir and bonus paterfamilias
The analysis of the cautio fructuaria poses another important problem: in some passages 
of the Digest and of the Pauli Sententiae we ﬁ nd a reference to the paterfamilias17, the 
good head of a household.
A few authors have tried to solve the problem of the coexistence of the vir bonus and 
the bonus paterfamilias18.
First, we shall brieﬂ y mention Giovanni Bortolucci’s idea that originally the standard 
of behaviour of the ﬁ rst clause of the cautio fructuaria was not the arbitrium boni viri, 
but the bonus paterfamilias. Instead the criterion of the arbitrium boni viri would have 
been present in the clause de restituendo, which, according to him, was separated from 
the cautio de utendo.
This theory has been criticized by all the following Romanists, for example by 
G. Grosso19. Indeed, it is quite improbable and it shows the excess of the interpolationist 
doctrine.
As for G. Grosso’s assessment of the problem, the expression bonus or optimus pa-
ter familias do not refer to a criterion different from the arbitrio boni viri, but it is just 
a paraphrase of the praetorian edict20.
I am not completely persuaded by G. Grosso’s dismissal of the problem. I do not 
think that it is possible to label the reference to the bonus paterfamilias as a simple way 
of paraphrasing the arbitrium boni viri.
We cannot completely identify the vir bonus with the bonus pater familias, as it clear-
ly shown by Venuleius 1 stipulationum D. 45, 1, 137, 2: Cum ita stipulatus sum “Ephesi 
dari?” inest tempus: quod autem accipi debeat, quaeritur. Et magis est, ut totam eam 
rem ad iudicem, id est ad virum bonum remittamus, qui aestimet, quanto tempore dili-
16 See G. Falcone, L’attribuzione della qualiﬁ ca “vir bonus” nella prassi giudiziaria di età repubblicana 
(a proposito di Cato, or. frg. 186 Sblend. = 206 Malc.), “Annali del Seminario giuridico Università degli Studi 
di Palermo” 54 (2010–2011) 90 sq.
17 See Ulpianus 79 ad edictum D. 7, 1, 9, 2 (quasi bonus pater familias); Paulus 3 ad Sabinum D. 7, 8, 
15, 1 (bonus paterfamilias); Pauli Sententiae 1, 11, 2 (ipse pater familiae); Pauli Sententiae 3, 6, 27 (optimus 
pater familias). There is also Ulpianus 79 ad edictum D. 7, 1, 9, 7 (pater familias), but, as we will see, this 
case is different from the others.
18 For C.A. Cannata’s theory see above, part 3.
19 See G. Grosso, Usufrutto e ﬁ gure…, p. 285.
20 Ibidem.
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gens pater familias conﬁ cere possit, quod facturum se promiserit […]21. The vir bonus 
is something quite different and much larger than the bonus or diligens pater familias.
Indeed, the diligentia of the pater familias is a pattern of behaviour which permits 
to asses the culpa22, whereas the vir bonus is a standard of behaviour, which is not only 
conﬁ ned to liability. In our juristic sources the bonus paterfamilias is strongly linked to 
liability, may it be contractual or extra-contractual. The difference between these con-
cepts is displayed by the above mentioned passage of Venuleius. The iudex’s behaviour 
is to be that of a vir bonus, not of a bonus paterfamilias.
7. Meaning of the expression bonus vir
As for the meaning of the expression vir bonus, it has been clearly shown by Giuseppe 
Falcone, scholars are divided in two groups: for some of them, especially the older ones, 
vir bonus had chieﬂ y a moral meaning, whereas for others this expression had mainly 
a social meaning23. The two latest works on the vir bonus, G. Falcone L’attribuzione 
della qualiﬁ ca ‘vir bonus’ nella prassi giudiziaria di età repubblicana and Roberto Fiori 
Bonus vir. Politica, ﬁ losoﬁ a, retorica e diritto nel de ofﬁ ciis di Cicerone24, also follow 
this pattern. In fact, G. Falcone asserts that from our Republican sources25 we can clearly 
understand that vir bonus had an ethical signiﬁ cance, whereas R. Fiori defends the social 
one. The same different interpretations can be found about the bonus paterfamilias.
For this paper, we can leave aside the problem of the original meaning of vir bonus 
and focus on its sense in the cautio fructuaria. Here it is seems to me quite probable that 
this expression, and also bonus paterfamilias, had an ethical sense. In fact, we can not 
imagine that in the cautio fructuaria the iudex should have decided in accordance with 
the judgement of a wealthy man.
8. Difference between bonus vir and bonus paterfamilias
Nevertheless, the concepts of vir bonus and bonus paterfamilias are to be distin-
guished: in the juridical sources the recourse to the concept of the bonus paterfamilias 
is less wide. Indeed, it is limited to the assessment of the culpa, whereas we ﬁ nd a refer-
ence to the concept of the vir bonus in a great number of institutions: sale, lease, cor-
21 A. Watson translated this passage the following way: “When I stipulate thus, ‘to be paid at Ephesus’ 
time is implicitly allowed. How much is questioned. It is preferable to have recourse to the judge, as a good 
man, who will assesses the time which the conscientious head of a household would need to do what is 
promised”.
22 About these problems see with bibliography, G. Santucci, Diligentia quam in suis, “Quaderni del 
dipartimento di Scienze giuridiche dell’Università degli Studi di Trento” 2008, no. 73, p. 1–131.
23 Falcone, L’attribuzione della…, p. 59 sq. with bibliography.
24 R. Fiori, Bonus vir. Politica, ﬁ losoﬁ a, retorica e diritto nel de ofﬁ ciis di Cicerone (Qu aderni dei modelli 
teorici e metodologici nella storia del diritto privato, 5), Napoli 2011.
25 For example, Cat., or. frg. 186 Sblend. = 206 Malc. or Cic., de off. 3, 77.
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poration, dowry, will, ﬁ deicommissum. That can be demonstrated by a research in the 
Vocabularium Iurisprudentiae Romanae, where we ﬁ nd that vir bonus a larger scope.
The vir bonus and the bonus paterfamilias refer partially to the same semantic ﬁ eld, 
to the idea of respectability and integrity, but in our juristic sources the latter was indis-
solubly linked to the assessment of the responsibility. The evaluation of the behaviour 
of the usufructuary is an assessment of the contractual responsibility and thus the juris-
consults recurred to this notion in order to better explain exactly what behaviour was 
requested of the usufructuary. Thus it was possible to explain and better deﬁ ne what a vir 
bonus would do by recurring to the concept of the bonus paterfamilias.
Uti frui arbitrio boni viri: Standard of Behaviour or Reference to an Arbitrator?
S u m m a r y
The objective of this contribution is to analyse the meaning of the expression uti frui arbitrio boni 
viri. This expression is contained in one of the clauses of the cautio fructuaria, which is the warranty 
given by the usufructuary to the owner. We can ﬁ nd this expression in a dozen passages of the Digest. 
The entire title 9 of book seven is dedicated to the cautio fructuaria, which was given in the form of 
a stipulatio praetoria. Uti frui arbitrio boni viri raises a question, that this paper aims to answer: does it 
refer to an arbitrator or to an abstract standard of behaviour? The expression arbitrium boni viri is not 
the only one that we ﬁ nd in our sources. In fact there is a concurrent expression, diligens pater familias, 
which can be found in two passages of the Digest and in two passages of the Pauli Sententiae. I aim to 
understand why our sources left us two different expressions and if there is a difference between them.
